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This contribution deals with the question of whether a judgment 
from a mainstream court dealing with customary law can be 
regarded as authority and thus as a recording of a customary 
rule or rules. When a mainstream court develops customary law 
to promote constitutional values or strikes customary law down 
for want of constitutionality, it creates new rules which are 
written down but which can easily be changed when society 
brings it to court and convinces the court that the rule needs to 
be changed. It is my contention that case law is a binding source 
of law, including customary law, which must be followed until 
such time that it is either absorbed into legislation or amended 
by a subsequent decision in terms of the principle of stare 
decisis. It gives us some measure of assurance as to the law to 
be followed. The high number of customary law disputes taken 
to a court of law is confirmation that traditional communities are 
embracing the power of the courts to settle their disputes. The 
judgments of these courts inevitably become the origins of 
customary rules that they develop and can thus be regarded as 
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1  Introduction 
Scholarly discourses and judicial pronouncements on customary law have 
seen an unprecedented surge after receiving constitutional recognition in 
South Africa's first democratic constitution, and this trend continues. The 
transitional Constitution1 recognised indigenous law in 1994,2 and ensured 
a prominent place for it in the final Constitution by promising that 
"[i]ndigenous law, like common law, shall be recognised and applied by the 
courts".3 The intention could not have been clearer: the common law and 
indigenous law were from now on to be treated alike. 
The final Constitution does not refer to common law and indigenous law in 
the same breath, as did the transitional Constitution, but it also recognises 
that the institution of traditional leadership observes a "system of customary 
law", and compels the courts to apply customary law when applicable, 
though subject to the Constitution and any other legislation.4 It is generally 
accepted that the mandatory wording of the final Constitution elevated 
customary law to the same position as the common law5 and, although it is 
not always easy to treat them alike, that is exactly what the courts have 
been trying to do. So far three approaches can be identified. Firstly, in Bhe 
v Magistrate, Khayelitsha,6 the Constitutional Court declined to develop the 
customary rule of male primogeniture to allow women to inherit and applied 
the common law of intestate succession, which treats beneficiaries equally, 
in its stead. Although this approach can be criticised, it is a good example 
                                            
*  Christa Rautenbach. B Iuris (cum laude) LLB (cum laude) LLM LLD (NWU formerly the 
PU for CHE). Professor at the Faculty of Law, North-West University, Potchefstroom, 
South Africa. Email: christa.rautenbach@nwu.ac.za. I am indebted to the National 
Research Foundation and the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation for their generous 
funding. Errors and views remain for my own account. 
1  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993. It commenced on 27 April 
1994 and was replaced by the final Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 
(the Constitution) on 4 February 1997. 
2  The 1993 Constitution did not provide for the direct recognition of customary law. 
Instead, it provided in s 181(1) for the recognition of a "traditional authority which 
observes a system of indigenous law", and in s 181(2) that "[i]ndigenous law shall be 
subject to regulation by law". 
3  Principle XIII, Schedule 4 of the transitional Constitution. The transitional Constitution 
contained a set of principles in Schedule 4 that had to be taken into account when the 
final Constitution was drafted. In terms of s 71(2) of the transitional Constitution, the 
Constitutional Court had to testify that all the provisions in the final text complied with 
these principles. This was done in In re: Certification of the Constitution of the Republic 
of South Africa, 1996 1996 10 BCLR 1253 (CC). 
4  See s 211 of the Constitution. It is generally accepted that the terms "indigenous" and 
"customary" law are synonyms and that they should be treated as such.  
5  Bennett Customary Law 39; Alexkor Ltd v Richtersveld Community 2003 12 BCLR 1301 
(CC) para 51. 
6  Bhe v Magistrate, Khayelitsha 2005 1 SA 580 (CC). 
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of instances where the common and customary law of succession have 
been fused to provide a better outcome for women and children other than 
the first born male.7  
By contrast, the second approach confirms the prerogative of a community 
to develop its own rules. In Shilubana v Nwamitwa,8 the Constitutional Court 
sanctioned the development of a customary rule favouring males as 
traditional leaders to allow a female to become the traditional leader at the 
request of the community.  
In the third example, the Constitutional Court in MM v MN9 developed a 
Tsonga custom to make it compulsory for a husband to obtain the 
permission of his wife to enter into a consecutive marriage.  
Although the three approaches are totally different, they have one thing in 
common – the proceedings were initiated by people who follow customary 
law. It may be argued that the fact that the people themselves are bringing 
their disputes to the courts to resolve is an indication that the judiciary can 
produce case law as an authoritative source of developing customary law. 
In accordance with the principle of stare decisis (to stand by precedents), 
the cases mentioned in this contribution (and the many others not dealt with) 
provide a measure of certainty to people and the judiciary. They are judicial 
precedent and thus binding on everyone and everything. The principle of 
stare decisis provides "[c]ertainty, predictability, reliability, equality, 
uniformity, [and] convenience"10 and is, according to the Constitutional 
Court, a "manifestation of the rule of law itself, which is in turn a founding 
value of our Constitution".11 
In addition to the principle of stare decisis, the courts have been 
constitutionally endowed with the power to develop the common and 
customary law under certain circumstances, though it has not been done 
consistently. Section 8(3) of the Constitution – notice the absence of 
customary law – stipulates:  
When applying a provision of the Bill of Rights to a natural or juristic person 
in terms of subsection (2), a court –  
(a) in order to give effect to a right in the Bill, must apply, or if necessary 
develop, the common law to the extent that legislation does not give 
effect to that right; and  
                                            
7  Rautenbach 2014 Acta Juridica 132-159. 
8  Shilubana v Nwamitwa 2009 2 SA 66 (CC). 
9  MM v MN 2013 4 SA 415 (CC). 
10  Hahlo and Kahn South African Legal System 215. 
11  Camps Bay Ratepayers and Residents Association v Harrison 2011 2 BCLR 121 (CC) 
para 28. 
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(b) may develop rules of the common law to limit the right, provided that 
the limitation is in accordance with section 36(1).12 
In addition, the interpretation clause, section 39(2), includes customary law 
and reads:  
When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common law or 
customary law, every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport 
and objects of the Bill of Rights. 
Section 173 confirms the "inherent power" of the higher courts to develop 
the common law that they had in terms of the common law, but customary 
law is not mentioned. It stipulates:13 
The Constitutional Court, Supreme Court of Appeal and High Courts have 
the inherent power to protect and regulate their own process, and to develop 
the common law, taking into account the interests of justice. 
The exclusion of customary law is intriguing. Does it mean that the higher 
courts can develop customary law only in terms of section 39(2) to "promote 
the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights" and not in terms of section 
173? The courts always had an inherent jurisdiction to fill gaps in the 
common law "to meet the needs of a changing society".14 This is referred to 
as "judicial-law making",15 and this is probably what the inherent power in 
section 173 also refers to. The Constitutional Court has confirmed that 
section 173 should be used sparingly; it cannot be used to simply ignore a 
statute or to side-step a statute by "resorting to the common law".16 
Recently, in Mokone v Tassos Properties,17 it held that section 173 could 
also be employed to develop the common law outside the ambit of section 
39(2). 
The courts, however, never had a similar power to fill gaps in the customary 
law, and its (deliberate?) exclusion from section 173 could mean that they 
still do not have such a power. Nevertheless, it has often been said that the 
                                            
12  Emphasis added. Subs 2 reads: "A provision of the Bill of Rights binds a natural or a 
juristic person if, and to the extent that, it is applicable, taking into account the nature of 
the right and the nature of any duty imposed by the right." 
13  Emphasis added. 
14  Amod v Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accident Fund 1998 4 SA 753 (CC) para 22. 
15  Hahlo and Kahn South African Legal System 304-305. Also see the earlier dicta that 
the authors cite to illustrate the courts' power to create new law. 
16  See Phillips v National Director of Public Prosecution 2006 2 BCLR 274 (CC) paras 46-
52 and the cases cited. In S v Thunzi 2010 10 BCLR 983 (CC) para 51 the Court 
conceded that s 173 could also be used to do more than just fill legislative gaps if the 
interest of justice required it. 
17  Mokone v Tassos Properties 2017 1 BCLR 1261 (CC) para 41. 
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provisions of the Constitution must be read as a whole, and in S v Lubisi18 
the Court pointed out that section 173 must be read with other sections of 
the Constitution, including section 39(2), to interpret the inherent power of 
the court to develop the common law. To date, the need has not arisen to 
interpret the application of section 173 on customary law, but I can imagine 
that it could be relevant to fill a gap in official customary law. I cannot foresee 
how it could be applied if the gap in question has arisen in the context of 
living customary law. 
Historically, customary law has been orally transmitted. Although parts of it 
have now been recorded in legislation, case law and textbooks, it is 
essentially unwritten.19 As explained in Alexkor Ltd v Richtersveld 
Community:20 
In applying indigenous law, it is important to bear in mind that, unlike common 
law, indigenous law is not written. It is a system of law that was known to the 
community, practised and passed on from generation to generation. It is a 
system of law that has its own values and norms. Throughout its history it has 
evolved and developed to meet the changing needs of the community. And it 
will continue to evolve within the context of its values and norms consistently 
with the Constitution. 
True to the modern tradition of documentation,21 many customary laws have 
been reduced to writing by scholars, and though these sources are still 
referred to in the courts, it has been reasoned that they must be used with 
caution, because they were viewed from a different context – the common 
law – and might not reflect the true position.22 At least three types of 
customary law are identified: official customary law, which is found in 
statutes, case law and authoritative textbooks; academic teachings; and 
living customary law.23 The idea of living customary law that has not been 
reduced to writing is not novel. Even before the constitutional recognition of 
customary law, the Appellate Division in Sigcau v Sigcau24 pointed out that 
Pondo law and custom is mostly a body of unwritten law, and that even the 
rules that have been recorded in reports or cases are merely opinions and 
                                            
18  S v Lubisi 2003 9 BCLR 1041 (T) 1051. As explained by the Court: "Although the powers 
granted to the court in terms of section 173 of the Constitution still have to be exercised 
with caution and circumspection, the Constitution has broadened the scope for judicial 
activism where such appears to be in the interest of justice (at 1052)." 
19  Bennett Customary Law 2. 
20  Alexkor Ltd v Richtersveld Community 2003 12 BCLR 1301 (CC) para 53. Footnotes 
omitted. 
21  Contrary to the written tradition of the Romans, other European tribes had unwritten 
laws. Madden 2013 Widener LJ 757-828. 
22  Alexkor Ltd v Richtersveld Community 2003 12 BCLR 1301 (CC) para 54; Shilubana v 
Nwamitwa 2009 2 SA 66 (CC) para 44. 
23  Bhe v Magistrate, Khayelitsha 2005 1 SA 580 (CC) para 152. 
24  Sigcau v Sigcau 1944 AD 76. 
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statements of "what someone at some time said the custom was". The only 
way a court could determine what the customary rule entailed was to "hear 
evidence as to that custom from those best qualified to give it and to decide 
the dispute in accordance with such evidence as appears in the 
circumstances to be most probably correct". 
However, locating the true content of a customary rule falls outside the 
scope of my paper. What I am concerned with is the question of whether a 
judgment dealing with customary law can be regarded as authority and thus 
as a documentation of a customary rule or rules. Take the MM v MN25 case, 
for example; would the fact that the Constitutional Court developed Tsonga 
law to require a husband to obtain his wife's permission to marry a 
subsequent wife be respected and followed by the community? In other 
words, could a customary rule that was developed by a court be regarded 
as an authoritative source or origin of the rule? At this point, I have to 
concede that this is probably a question which calls for extensive fieldwork; 
however, one might argue that it should because judgments are another 
way of creating law. 
2 Contextualising the issues 
Before I continue sharing my ideas on case law as an authoritative source 
of customary law, let me briefly explain what some of the concepts mean 
within the context of this paper. 
Let us commence with the meaning of law. The quest to find a universally 
accepted definition of law has been keeping legal theorists busy for a very 
long time, and will continue to do so.26 Our understanding of law is premised 
on different worldviews, paradigms and contexts.27 For the purpose of my 
discussion, I prefer to take the easy way out by proposing a functional 
approach. Considering that one of the functions of law is to "ensure order in 
the relationships and interactions among people28 and between people and 
                                            
25  MM v MN 2013 4 SA 415 (CC). 
26  Donlan and Urscheler Concepts of Law (2014) contains a collection of chapters on 
differing viewpoints regarding the meaning of law. 
27  Humbey et al Introduction to Law 2. Donlan and Urscheler Concepts of Law (2016) 1-
18 discusses the effect of context, across both time and space, on the meaning of law. 
They propose a multidisciplinary approach to the understanding of law that does not 
impose Western standards but recognises that there is a diversity of perspectives which 
does not always involve state institutions. Such an approach would include cultural 
perspectives such as customary law. 
28  In this definition, the word "people" should be given a broad meaning to include the state 
as well. 
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things in a society", law can simply be defined as normative rules29 "made 
by society for society".30 As aptly put by Hahlo and Kahn in their iconic book 
on the making of the South African legal system:31 
Law is the warp and woof of social life, and so far from being concerned with 
a narrowly circumscribed area, is all pervasive. It is not only concerned with 
the pathology of society, but with its physiology as well. 
This idea of law is premised on the social contract theory of Hobbes – there 
is a social contract in terms of which the people authorise their leaders to 
make laws to create order within society.32 
Some may disapprove of my simplistic view of what law is, but taking the 
view that law is "an attribute of human life that appears when people group 
or associate themselves into a society"33 might be useful to explain why we 
have a South African legal order where different legal systems regulate the 
relationships and interactions between the people and/or things on different 
levels. It provides some explanation, besides historical events, for the 
presence of legal pluralism, a social and legal phenomenon, in South 
Africa.34  
Although legal pluralism is an equally fluid concept, it basically refers to the 
existence of multiple legal systems within one geographical area.35 In South 
                                            
29  I am well aware that by using the term "normative", I step right into another minefield, 
namely the distinction (if there is one) between law and other social norms based on, 
for example, culture or religion. During my law student days, I understood the difference 
between a legal and a social norm simply to be the following: a legal norm is a 
mandatory rule of social behaviour established by a state organ while a social norm is 
a group-held belief about how members of a community should (not must) behave in a 
given situation. Nowadays, I have come to realise that the solution is not as simple as 
that. In a pluralistic legal system such as in South Africa, where two seemingly 
incompatible legal systems exist side by side, the one well-documented and developed 
and the other essentially consisting of oral accounts of social practices of traditional 
communities, there are no clear lines between the "legal" and "social" of norms. 
Furthermore, I have come to realise that the involvement of a state organ is not essential 
in establishing what is regarded as law. See Rautenbach "Thinking about Norms in 
Pluralistic Societies" 110-113. 
30  Humbey et al Introduction to Law 1. 
31  Hahlo and Kahn South African Legal System 1. 
32  Hobbes Elements of Law ch 9. 
33  Humbey et al Introduction to Law 1. 
34  Legal pluralism is regarded as both a social and a legal phenomenon. See Desmet 
"Legal Pluralism and International Human Rights Law" 41. 
35  Griffiths 1986 J Legal Plur 1, 13-17. He distinguishes between deep and weak legal 
pluralism. Deep legal pluralism, according to him, is based on the ideology of legal 
centralism. In other words, there must be state recognition. South African customary 
law and common law are examples of recognised legal systems. Weak legal pluralism, 
on the other hand, concedes that other or opposing norms may exist and exert some 
authority on peoples' social lives. The state may even play a subordinate role to the 
regulation implemented by an informal authority. Islamic law is an example of such a 
system that is not recognised but is followed by the adherents to Islam nonetheless.  
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Africa, for example, the common law exists alongside the customary law. 
The plurality of the South African legal system – the product of more than 
300 years of European settlement, colonialism and apartheid – is 
undisputed. Historical events are important to understand changes or 
developments in law and society. As pointed out by Watson, a "theory of the 
relationship between law and society must rest … on detailed knowledge of 
the history of individual legal systems".36 Although history might explain why 
law is what it is, legal change is inevitable and customary law would also 
have changed, though we can only speculate how it would have changed, 
were it not for Western contact.37 
Customary law today is not a unified system of law; it has never been. It 
consists of diverse legal systems made up of the rules of the various 
communities living in rural areas. Even though those rules are grounded in 
the community, they are regarded as binding. Hamnett38 describes 
customary law as "a set of norms which the actors in a social situation 
abstract from practice and which they invest with binding authority". Also, 
Bennett39 describes customary law as a legal system that "derives from 
social practices that the community concerned accepts as obligatory". 
South African legislation recognises these social features of customary law. 
For example, the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998 
defines "customary law" as "the customs and usages traditionally observed 
among the indigenous African peoples of South Africa and which form part 
of the culture of those peoples".40 
Most scholarly literature refers to the South African legal system as a dual 
system of law, consisting of the common law (predominantly a Roman-
Dutch and English law mix) and customary law (the indigenous laws of 
traditional communities). I have done the same in earlier writings.41 
However, it is perhaps time to stop focusing on this duality and to zoom in 
on the oneness of the South African legal system instead. Let me explain 
what I mean. South African law is to all intents and purposes an uncodified 
legal system, both common and customary law. Despite the existence of 
piecemeal legislation regulating certain aspects of both common and 
customary law, the South African legal system has not been "systematically 
recorded in a comprehensive code which serves as primary source of its 
                                            
36  Watson 1983 U Pa L Rev 1121, 1122. 
37  "Western" in this context refers to the Dutch and English colonial influences. 
38  Hamnett Chieftainship and Legitimacy 14. 
39  Bennett Customary Law 1. 
40  See s 1 of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998 (the Recognition 
Act). 
41  Rautenbach "Contribution of the Courts" 225-244. 
C RAUTENBACH PER / PELJ 2019 (22)  9 
origin and knowledge about it".42 As there is no primary source (or code) of 
South African law, we need to consult a wide collection of sources to find 
the law.43 These sources comprise the Constitution in a supreme position,44 
also legislation,45 judicial precedent,46 international and foreign law,47 
common law (old-authority),48 custom,49 customary law,50 and finally 
modern scholarly sources.51 The Constitution seems to treat both common 
and customary law as sources. One example is the interpretation clause, 
which recognises the existence of rights and freedoms outside the text of 
the Constitution, where they "are recognised or conferred by common law, 
                                            
42  Du Plessis Introduction to Law 75.  
43  According to Hahlo and Kahn South African Legal System 139-140 sources may be 
regarded historically (depending on their historical roots) or analytically, depending on 
the theoretical stance of the legal scholar doing the analysis. 
44  The Constitution announces its supremacy in s 2: "This Constitution is the supreme law 
of the Republic; law or conduct inconsistent with it is invalid, and the obligations imposed 
by it must be fulfilled." Emphasis added. 
45  Hahlo and Kahn South African Legal System ch 6 deals with legislation as a source of 
law. Though their discussion is outdated, it remains relevant.  
46  Judicial precedent refers to new legal rules that are developed by the courts. See Hahlo 
and Kahn South African Legal System chs 7 and 9 for a discussion of judicial precedent 
and judicial law making which remains relevant. Ss 8 and 39 of the Constitution confirm 
the developmental function of the courts with regard to the common and customary law. 
47  Section 39 of the Constitution confirms the important role of international and foreign 
law during judicial interpretation of the Bill of Rights. Ss 231-233 of the Constitution also 
regulate the position with regard to international agreements and customary 
international law. However, international law and foreign law are not binding sources 
and the courts need only to "consider" them, not to follow them. 
48  In the absence of legislation and case law, the law of old Roman-Dutch law authorities 
found in the 17th and 18th century sources of the law of Holland is applicable. However, 
nowadays, these sources are rarely consulted. Most of the common law rules have been 
stated in case law or modern textbooks. See Hahlo and Kahn South African Legal 
System 303; Humbey et al Introduction to Law 144. 
49  Custom in this context refers to the unwritten customs in society that obtained authority 
over a period of time. However, in order for a custom to obtain legal status, it has to 
comply with certain requirements and be affirmed by a court of law. The well-known 
case of Van Breda v Jacobs 1921 AD 330 serves as confirmation of the requirements 
which must be met. Also see Hahlo and Kahn South African Legal System 302-303; 
Humbey et al Introduction to Law 145. In Shilubana v Nwamitwa 2009 2 SA 66 (CC) 
para 54, the Constitutional Court pointed out that there are important differences 
between custom and customary law. The former refers to practices that could fill 
normative gaps in the common law. This means that custom is not an "original source 
of law capable of independent development" but simply an "accessory source". 
Conversely, customary law is an independent source of law which can develop on its 
own. 
50  As already alluded to, customary law is essentially the unwritten customs of traditional 
African communities, but it has not remained unscathed over the years. It has been 
supplemented, amended, developed or superseded by progressive governments, and 
by its coming into contact with other communities and modernity. Olivier "Indigenous 
Law" 1. 
51  Depending on the reputation of the authors, these sources are secondary sources of 
the law and have only persuasive value in the courts. 
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customary law or legislation".52 Though the Constitution does not say it in 
so many words, it regards the common and customary laws as sources of 
those rights and freedoms which might exist outside the constitutional text. 
Viewed this way, both common law and customary law are, at least 
theoretically, treated the same – they are both sources of South African law. 
Customary law is an independent source of South African law, just as 
common law is. As pointed out in Alexkor Ltd v Richtersveld Community:53 
… the Constitution acknowledges the originality and distinctiveness of 
indigenous law as an independent source of norms within the legal system. At 
the same time the Constitution, while giving force to indigenous law, makes it 
clear that such law is subject to the Constitution and has to be interpreted in 
the light of its values. Furthermore, like the common law, indigenous law is 
subject to any legislation, consistent with the Constitution, that specifically 
deals with it. In the result, indigenous law feeds into, nourishes, fuses with and 
becomes part of the amalgam of South African law. 
Taking the view that both common and customary law are sources of law, 
forming part of the "amalgam of South African law", also explains why those 
two apparently "independent" sources of law are often interlinked. After all, 
they have co-existed for many years in one geographical area, and it would 
be impossible for them to escape cross-pollination. Although most of those 
influences have been subtle, there are a few obvious examples, such as the 
modification of the common and customary law of succession.54 Therefore, 
our quest to keep common and customary law apart at all costs seems all 
the more perplexing. Maitland wrote the following on the quest to classify 
legal rules into neat compartments:55 
But do not get into the way of thinking of law as consisting of a number of 
independent compartments … . No, law is a body, a living body, every member 
of which is connected with and depends upon every other member. … Science 
deals with the body as a whole, and with every part of it as related to the 
whole. … [N]o good comes of refusing to see the truth, and the truth is that all 
parts of our law are very closely related to each other … . 
Insisting that South African law is a unity made up of a diversity of 
"independent sources", all linked together by a supreme Constitution, is in 
line with the preamble's aspirations of creating a country that is "united in 
our diversity". This being said, we need to acknowledge that there are 
fundamental differences in these two sources of South African law, 
                                            
52  See s 39(3) of the Constitution. 
53  Alexkor Ltd v Richtersveld Community 2003 12 BCLR 1301 (CC) para 51. Footnotes 
omitted, and emphasis added. 
54  See Rautenbach 2008 J Comp L 119-132. 
55  Although he refers to the branches of law such as administrative law, criminal law, family 
law, etc, the same argument is valid for the diverse legal systems in one geographical 
area. See Maitland Constitutional History of England 539. 
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especially with regard to the origins of the legal rules. Apart from common 
law custom (an unwritten source until affirmed by the court),56 the other 
sources of South African law are written down, while customary law is 
mostly unwritten. Orality is thus the most striking feature of original 
customary law. Bennett points out that this feature has a number of 
consequences.57 Firstly, customary law is ever-changing and is or at least 
is believed to be "always up to date". Secondly, the "law" in customary law 
is not always easy to distinguish from mere custom. Lastly, there is no 
involvement of people or other entities, such as a legislature, to make and 
document the law.58 However, the orality of customary law rules does not 
make them less binding on community members and therefore less "law" 
than other written law.59 
Does the orality of customary law make it impossible for case law to be 
regarded as authority for a customary law rule, because it has not originated 
from society but from a court of law? This question is closely related to my 
contention in the introduction that because people living under a system of 
customary law themselves are bringing their disputes to mainstream courts 
to resolve, it indicates that these courts can produce case law as an 
authoritative source of customary law. 
3  Case law as an authoritative source of customary law 
As already alluded to, for a source to be authoritative or binding, it must be 
regarded as such by society. How do we find those obligatory rules derived 
from social practices or the "customs and usages traditionally observed"? 
In other words, what are the sources or point of origin of customary law? 
Most legal scholars claim that the point of law is recognition by society, and 
that legal rules must be formulated by those people and institutions that 
society has chosen for this purpose.60 Hamnett writes that "customary law 
                                            
56  Referring to custom as acknowledged in Van Breda v Jacobs 1921 AD 330. 
57  Bennett Customary Law 2. 
58  Bennett Customary Law 2. However, one may argue that a traditional authority fulfils 
the role of a legislature in a customary law setting. 
59  Licht 2008 RLE 715-750. 
60  Humbey et al Introduction to Law 123. Some scholars argue that law's point must be 
found in the universal principles of morality and justice. This is the so-called "natural 
law" theory. There are many variations of this theory, but it essentially holds that law is 
"necessarily a rational standard for conduct"; it does not depend on human intervention 
but exists because it is natural, universal and a necessary consequence of human 
nature. Traditionally, a sharp contrast is drawn between natural law and legal positivism. 
In contrast to natural law, legal positivism regards law as a "socially recognised 
standard". See in general, Crowe 2016 Philosophy Compass 91-101 for a discussion of 
the natural law theories. 
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emerges from what people believe they ought to do, rather than from what 
a class of legal specialists consider they should do or believe".61 
A cursory search of the term "customary law" in the online database, 
MyLexisNexis,62 indicates that 150 judgments dealing with some or other 
customary law issue have been published since 1996. That means an 
average of almost 9 cases per year. However, is it highly probable that the 
actual number is much higher because many decisions are not published, 
and without empirical research of some kind, it would be difficult to know the 
exact number of customary law disputes that have been heard by the 
mainstream courts. At least three types of disputes may be distinguished, 
namely: disputes between individuals,63 between individuals and traditional 
leaders and/or authorities64 and between traditional leaders and/or 
authorities and government.65 
The great number of published cases on customary law illustrates two 
points I should like to make. Firstly, it demonstrates that those institutions 
and members of traditional communities who have the means to do so or 
who have access to legal aid prefer to settle their disputes in mainstream 
courts instead of using traditional dispute mechanisms. A culture of litigation 
sparked by the Constitution seems to be developing in traditional 
communities. Institutions and members of traditional communities are 
increasingly turning to the courts to litigate their issues. What does this 
mean, other than that they obviously trust the judiciary to solve their 
                                            
61  Hamnett Chieftainship and Legitimacy 10. 
62  LexisNexis 2018 http://www.mylexisnexis.co.za/ (subscription needed). 
63  The great bulk of cases falls in this category, and most of them deal with family disputes 
in a human rights context. A well-known example is Bhe v Magistrate, Khayelitsha 2005 
1 SA 580 (CC), where the constitutionality of the customary rule of male primogeniture 
was successfully challenged.  
64  For example, in Bangindawo v Head of the Nyanda Regional Authority; Hlantlalala v 
Head of the Western Tembuland Regional Authority 1998 3 BCLR 314 (Tk) two 
applications were brought before the Transkei High Court. The applicant in the one case 
disputed the jurisdiction of the Nyanda Regional Authority over him, and the applicant 
in the other case disputed the jurisdiction of the Western Tembuland Regional Authority. 
They based their cases on the fact that the former Transkei had been re-incorporated 
into South Africa, that they were no longer citizens of Transkei but of South Africa, and 
therefore the courts which were established for the Transkei no longer had jurisdiction 
over them. The court of appeal held, however, that the Constitution made provision for 
the continuance of legislation in the former homelands and that the regional courts 
remained in operation for the time being. Shortly after the judgment had been delivered, 
the courts were discontinued. See Rautenbach and Bekker Introduction to Legal 
Pluralism 245. 
65  For example, in Sepadi v Premier of Limpopo Provincial Government 2016 JOL 34328 
(GP) the applicant averred that he was a recognised headman and sought an order 
declaring the termination of his salary as unlawful. The Court held that he had the onus 
of producing a certificate as recognition and because he had not, the application was 
dismissed. 
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disputes? It would not be outrageous to argue that they regard case law as 
an authoritative source of customary law. Secondly, one could argue that 
their insistence on settling their disputes in mainstream courts instead of 
utilising traditional dispute mechanisms shows that they no longer trust 
these traditional methods to deliver fair or binding outcomes. This could 
mean that their stance on Western justice has undergone a fundamental 
change. It is highly probable that they accept it as authoritative and thus 
binding. 
Let me illustrate with an example. During the lifetime of Masewa Netshituka, 
a businessman from Thohoyandou, he married five wives. Three of the 
marriages were customary (Tshinakaho, Masindi and Diana) and two were 
civil marriages (Martha and Joyce). When he died on 4 January 2008, he 
was survived by Tshinakaho, Diana and Joyce and a number of children 
born from these marriages. Masindi had already died in 1995, and he had 
previously divorced Martha in 1984. In accordance with the consequences 
of a civil marriage, Masewa's marriage to Joyce was in community of 
property and she was legally entitled to half of Masewa's estate. His 
customary law wives were less fortunate. In terms of Venda customary law, 
they had no ownership or control over the marital property and, except for 
the bequests he made to them in his will, they would not have been entitled 
to any of his property or that which fell into Joyce's half of the estate. In 
addition, the deceased had executed a will in which he had made certain 
bequests regarding his half share in the joint estate.66 Tshinakaho and some 
of the deceased's children were unhappy with their exclusion from the 
deceased's estate and they began with litigation in all earnest. 
In Netshituka v Netshituka,67 they launched an application for an order 
declaring the marriage between the deceased and Joyce null and void, and 
the will invalid.68 Unfortunately, Tshinakaho and Diana had passed away 
before the judgment was delivered, three years after the death of the 
deceased. Five judges of the Supreme Court of Appeal agreed that the 
marriage between the deceased and Joyce was a nullity because he was 
not allowed to conclude a civil marriage while he was still involved in 
customary marriages, but they refused to declare the will invalid.  
The children had succeeded in having the deceased's civil marriage with 
Joyce declared a nullity, but they did not take lightly their defeat in respect 
of the validity of the will. They instituted proceedings again in the High Court 
                                            
66  He bequeathed his half share of the joint estate to his wives, including Joyce, and all 
his children. See Ramuhovhi v President of the RSA 2016 6 SA 210 (LT) para 9. 
67  Netshituka v Netshituka 2011 5 SA 453 (SCA). 
68  The validity of the will also came under attack, but the attack did not succeed. 
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of Thohoyandou in Ramuhovhi v President of the RSA.69 This time their 
strategy was to attack the constitutionality of section 7(1) of the Recognition 
Act. This provision stipulates that "[t]he proprietary consequences of a 
customary marriage entered into before the commencement of this Act 
continue to be governed by customary law".70 As already explained, Venda 
law excludes wives from the ownership and control of marital property, and 
they were thus effectively barred from the ownership of the deceased's 
estate. Joyce, the discarded civil law71 wife, was part of the proceedings 
again. She also contended that section 7(1) was invalid and argued that, 
though her civil marriage to the deceased had been declared a nullity, she 
and the deceased had also entered into a customary marriage in 1996, and 
she was for all technical purposes also a customary law wife of the 
deceased who must share in the property if section 7(1) were to be declared 
unconstitutional.72 After a constitutional analysis, the High Court found that 
section 7(1) was indeed discriminatory and thus invalid.73 In addition, 
customary law had to be developed to allow women in polygynous 
marriages concluded before the Recognition Act to enjoy equal rights in and 
over matrimonial property. The order was referred to the Constitutional 
Court for confirmation.74 
In Ramuhovhi v President of the RSA,75 the Constitutional Court confirmed 
the High Court's declaration of invalidity. The order of invalidity was 
suspended for 24 months (to 30 November 2019) to afford parliament the 
opportunity to amend the legislation to correct the invalid provision. Until 
such amendment has been made, a husband and all his wives have joint 
and equal ownership over joint property.76 
An interesting development occurred while the case was being heard in the 
Constitutional Court. An application for leave to intervene was made by 
woman who was a second wife in another polygynous marriage. When her 
                                            
69  Ramuhovhi v President of the RSA 2016 6 SA 210 (LT). 
70  Emphasis added. 
71  The criticisms raised against this judgment are not relevant for this discussion, but it has 
been argued that the outcome discards the patrimonial and human rights of a civil law 
wife in favour of the customary law wives. See Buchner-Eveleigh 2012 De Jure 604. 
72  Ramuhovhi v President of the RSA 2016 6 SA 210 (LT) para 29. 
73  Ramuhovhi v President of the RSA 2016 6 SA 210 (LT) para 75. 
74  See Ramuhovhi v President of the RSA 2016 6 SA 210 (LT) para 76 for the final order 
of the Court. 
75  Ramuhovhi v President of the RSA 2018 2 BCLR 217 (CC). The judgment was delivered 
on 30 November 2017. 
76  In the case of house property, the husband and the wife of the house concerned jointly 
have control over the property and in the case of family property, the husband and all 
the wives jointly have control over the property. Personal property, however, remains 
the property of the spouses, 
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husband died, she had discovered that he had had a will in which he had 
stated that he was unmarried and in which he had bequeathed their family 
home to his eldest son by his first wife, who wanted to evict her when he 
learned of his windfall.77 The second wife intended to institute proceedings 
in another court with regard to her proprietary rights but had an interest in 
how the Constitutional Court in Ramuhovhi v President of the RSA intended 
framing the order of retrospectivity. Therefore, it was important for her that 
the Court made an order that protects estates which have not yet been 
wound up. The Court agreed with her contentions and she was granted 
leave to intervene. The order that the Court in Ramuhovhi v President of the 
RSA eventually made with regard to retrospectivity was eventually in her 
favour. It ordered that the declaration of invalidity of section 7(1) of the 
Recognition Act was retrospective except where a deceased estate had 
already been wound up or the transfer of marital property had been 
finalised. The situation would be different, however, if the transferee of the 
marital property were, at the time of the transfer, aware that the property 
was subject to a legal challenge.78 This caveat should act as a warning for 
anyone who wants to do another family member over by transferring the 
marital property despite it being subject to a dispute. 
The facts of these cases demonstrate the point I wish to make. Scholarly 
discourses on customary law usually focus on the differences between 
common and customary law, but it seems as if society has long since 
accepted the authority of the mainstream courts. The Netshituka family gave 
the impression that they have followed a traditional lifestyle in their private 
lives, but nevertheless approached the courts to solve their family disputes. 
The idea that the binding authority of customary law comes from society 
seems to be irreconcilable with the idea of precedent as a source of 
customary law. However, considering that society brings its customary law 
disputes to the courts, as illustrated by this example and the many others, 
the inference can be drawn that case law is indeed regarded, at least by the 
litigants, as an authoritative source of customary law. It is also true that the 
fact that one section of the community who can afford to bring litigation all 
the way up to precedent-making courts, provides no guarantee that the rest 
of the community whose customary law was the subject of adjudication 
would consider themselves bound by the decision which constitutes the 
precedent. Other dangers also lurk in the background. The possibility exists 
that this source of law (case law) has become skewed in favour of those 
who can afford to litigate, creating the possibility that affluent members of 
                                            
77  See Ramuhovhi v President of the RSA 2018 2 BCLR 217 (CC) paras 14-29. 
78  Ramuhovhi v President of the RSA 2018 2 BCLR 217 (CC) para 71, at points 7 and 8. 
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the communities define (indirectly through the litigation process) the law for 
the rest of the community. Although this is a real danger, there are many 
examples where poor litigants have been able to change the direction of 
customary law through the assistance of non-profit organisations, such as 
the Women's Legal Centre, which provides free legal advice and support to 
particularly women living under a system of customary law.79 Therefore, this 
risk should not prevent courts from involving themselves in the creation of 
customary rules where needed. 
4  Conclusion 
The sources of South African law, an uncodified diverse legal system, are 
manifold. They consist of common law, customary law, legislation, 
judgments, custom, the law of old authorities and other authentic sources. 
The origins of the legal rules found in these sources may differ considerably. 
The common law is a mixture of Roman-Dutch law and English law. 
Customary law, at least in its living form, consists of binding rules followed 
in traditional communities, and so on. 
The sources are interconnected, however. Together they form a living body 
of law called South African law which is constantly evolving as society is 
changing. Traditional communities trust the mainstream courts to solve their 
disputes. They challenge rules that are unconstitutional. Traditional 
authorities develop their rules and then ask the courts to endorse those 
changes. The list goes on. Surely these actions must all be an indication of 
acceptance of the authority of the courts by traditional communities and their 
leaders? 
When a mainstream court develops customary law to promote constitutional 
values or strikes customary law down for want of constitutionality, it creates 
new rules which are written down but which can easily be changed when 
society brings it to court and convinces the court that the rule needs to be 
changed. It is thus my contention that case law is a binding source of law, 
including customary law, which must be followed until such time that it is 
either absorbed into legislation or amended by a subsequent decision in 
terms of the principle of stare decisis. It gives us some measure of 
assurance as to the law to be followed.  
The high number of customary law disputes taken to a court of law is 
confirmation of the fact that traditional communities are embracing the 
power of the courts to settle their disputes. The judgments of these courts 
                                            
79  See the official website of the Centre where a number of those cases are listed – 
Women’s Legal Centre 2018 http://www.wlce.co.za/about-us/. 
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inevitably become the origins of customary rules that they develop and can 
thus be regarded as piecemeal recording of (living) customary law. 
I have to concede, however, that my views on this matter are tainted by the 
fact that I am a typical lawyer. It is inconceivable to me that customary law 
can continue to exist without the influence of precedent. On the one hand, 
the ossification of customary law by precedent is a reality but on the other 
hand, a precedent could be reversed or developed when there is a change 
in the community. To put it differently, when a court develops customary law 
through precedent, it creates a written rule of customary law but one which 
is changeable as the circumstances change or when a new precedent 
setting judgment is delivered. 
Finally, as I have already alluded to, only empirical research would be able 
to tell us if case law is indeed regarded as an authoritative source of 
customary law by community members. However, it would be a conundrum 
to argue that they do not while they seem to trust the mainstream courts 
enough to solve their customary law disputes. 
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